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Abstract—A central question in routing games has been to
establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either
in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question
is well understood in two classes of routing games. The first is
the non-atomic routing introduced by Wardrop on 1952 in the
context of road traffic in which each player (car) is infinitesimally
small; a single car has a negligible impact on the congestion.
Each car wishes to minimize its expected delay. Under arbitrary
topology, such games are known to have a convex potential and
thus a unique equilibrium. The second framework is splitable
atomic games: there are finitely many players, each controlling
the route of a population of individuals (let them be cars in road
traffic or packets in the communication networks). In this paper,
we study two other frameworks of routing games in which each of
several players has an integer number of connections (which are
population of packets) to route and where there is a constraint
that a connection cannot be split. Through a particular game
with a simple three link topology, we identify various novel and
surprising properties of games within these frameworks. We show
in particular that equilibria are non unique even in the potential
game setting of Rosenthal with strictly convex link costs. We
further show that non-symmetric equilibria arise in symmetric
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A central question in routing games has been to establish
conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibria, either in terms
of the network topology or in terms of the costs. A survey on
these issues is given in [1].
The question of uniqueness of equilibria has been studied
in two different frameworks. The first, which we call F1,
is the non-atomic routing introduced by Wardrop on 1952
in the context of road traffic in which each player (car) is
infinitesimally small; a single car has a negligible impact
on the congestion. Each car wishes to minimize its expected
delay. Under arbitrary topology, such games are known to have
a convex potential and thus have a unique equilibrium [2].
The second framework, denoted by F2, is splitable atomic
games. There are finitely many players, each controlling the
route of a population of individuals. This type of games have
already been studied in the context of road traffic by Haurie
and Marcotte [3] but have become central in the telecom
community to model routing decisions of Internet Service
Providers that can decide how to split the traffic of their
subscribers among various routes so as to minimize network
congestion [4].
In this paper we study properties of equilibria in two
other frameworks of routing games which exhibit surprising
behavior. The first, which we call F3, known as congestion
games [5], consists of atomic players with non splitable traffic:
each player has to decide on the path to be followed by for its
traffic and cannot split the traffic among various paths. This is
a non-splitable framework. We further introduce a new semi-
splitable framework, denoted by F4, in which each of several
players has an integer number of connections to route. It can
choose different routes for different connections but there is
a constraint that the traffic of a connection cannot be split.
In the case where each player controls the route of a single
connection and all connections have the same size, this reduces
to the congestion game of Rosenthal [5].
We consider in this paper routing games with additive costs
(i.e. the cost of a path equals to the sum of costs of the links
over the path) and the cost of a link is assumed to be convex
increasing in the total flow in the link. The main goal of this
paper is to study a particular symmetric game of this type in
a simple topology consisting of three nodes and three links.
We focus both on the uniqueness issue as well as on other
properties of the equilibria.
This game has already been studied within the two frame-
works F1-F2 that we mentioned above. In both frameworks it
was shown [6] to have a unique equilibrium. Our first finding
is that in frameworks F3 and F4 there is a multitude of
equilibria. The price of stability is thus different than the price
of anarchy and we compute both. We show the uniqueness of
the equilibrium in the limit as the number of players N grows
to infinity extending known results [3] from framework F2 to
the new frameworks. In framework F2 uniqueness is in fact
achieved not only for the limiting games but also for all N
large enough. We show that this is not the case for F3-F4:
for any finite N there may be several equilibria. We finally
show a surprising property of F4 that exhibits non symmetric
equilibria in our symmetric network example while under F1,
F2 and F3 there are no asymmetric equilibria.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first introduce
the model and the notations used in the while study, we then
move on to the properties of frameworks F3 (Section III)
and F4 (Section IV) before concluding the paper. For com-
pleteness, we also include in the Appendix the proofs of the
theorems and propositions of the paper although they will be
removed from the final manuscript so as to comply with the
conference regulations for final manuscript but will be made
available on ArXiv.
II. MODEL AND NOTATIONS
We shall use throughout the term atomic game to denote
situations in which decisions of a player have an impact
on other players’ utility. It is non-atomic when players are
infinitesimally small and are viewed like a fluid of players,
such that a single player has a negligible impact on the utility
of other players.
We consider a system of three nodes (A, B and C) with
two incoming traffic sources (respectively from node A and
B) and an exit node C. There are a total of N connections
originating from each one of the sources. Each connection can
either be sent directly to node C or rerouted via the remaining
node. The system is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Physical System
This model has been used to model load balancing issues
in computer networks, see [6] and references therein. Jobs
arrive to two computing centers represented by nodes A and
B. A job can be processed locally at the node where it arrives
or it may be forwarded to the other node incurring further
communication delay. The costs of links [AC] and [BC]
represent the processing delays of jobs processed at nodes A
and B respectively. Once processed, the jobs leave the system.
A connection is a collection of jobs with similar characteristics
(e.g. belonging to the same application).
We introduce the following notations:
• A link between two nodes, say A and B, is denoted by
[AB]. Our considered system has three links [AB], [BC]
and [AC].
• A route is simply referred by a sequence of nodes. Hence,
the system has four connections: two originating from
node A (route AC and ABC) and two originating from
node B (route BC and BAC).
Further, in the following, nAC , nBC , nABC and nBAC will
refer to the number of connections routed via the different
routes while n[AC], n[BC] and n[AB] will refer to the num-
ber of connections on each subsequent link. By conservation
law, we have:
nAC + nABC = nBC + nBAC = N
and

n[AC] = nAC + nBAC ,
n[BC] = nABC + nBC ,
n[AB] = nBAC + nABC .
For each route r, we also define the fraction (among N ) of
flow using it, i.e. fr = nr/N . The conservation law becomes
fAC + fABC = fBC + fBAC = 1.
Finally, the performance measure considered in this work
is the cost (delay) of connections experienced on their route.
We consider a simple model in which the cost is additive (i.e.
the cost of a connection on a route is simply taken as the
sum of delays experienced by the connection over the links
that constitute this route). We further assume that the costs on
each link are linear with coefficient a/N on link [AB] and
coefficient b/N on link [AC] and [BC], i.e.
C[AB] =
a
N
n[AB] = a(fBAC + fABC),
C[AC] =
b
N
n[AC] = b(fBAC + fAC),
C[BC] =
b
N
n[BC] = b(fBC + fABC).
and then:
CAB = C[AB], CABC = C[AB] + C[BC],
CBC = C[BC], CBAC = C[AB] + C[AC].
We restrict our study to the (pure) Nash equilibria and give the
equilibria in terms of the corresponding flows marked by a star.
By conservation law, the equilibria is uniquely determined by
the specification of f∗ABC and f∗BAC (or equivalently n∗ABC
and n∗BAC).
We recall that in this paper, we consider two types of
decision models. In the first (F3), the decision is taken at
the connection level (Section III), i.e. each connection has its
own decision maker that seeks to minimize the connection’s
cost, and the connection cannot be split into different routes.
In the second (F4), (Section IV) each one of the two source
nodes decides on the routing of all the connections originating
there. Each connection of a given source node (either A or B)
can be routed independently but a connection cannot be split
into different route. We hence refer to F4 this semi-splitable
framework. Note that the two-approaches (F3 and F4) coincide
when there is only N = 1 connection at each source, which
we also detail later.
III. ATOMIC NON-SPLITABLE CASE AND ITS NON-ATOMIC
LIMIT (F3 FRAMEWORK)
We consider here the case where each connection belongs
to an individual user acting selfishly.
We first show that for fixed parameters, the game may have
several equilibria, all of which are symmetric for any number
of players. The number of distinct equilibria can be made
arbitrary large by an appropriate choice of the parameters a
and b, and for any choice of a and b, there exists N0 such
that the number of equilibria remain constant for all N ≥ N0.
We then show properties of the limiting game obtained as the
number of of players increases to infinity.
A. Non-uniqueness of the equilibrium
Theorem 1. The set of pure Nash equilibria of the game are
the points satisfying n∗BAC = n∗ABC ≤
b
2a
.
Proof: Consider an equilibrium (n∗ABC , n∗BAC). Then, we
have the following conditions:
C[AC] = CAC ≤ (C[AB] + a/N) + (C[BC] + b/N)
C[BC] = CBC ≤ (C[AB] + a/N) + (C[AC] + b/N)
C[AB] + C[BC] = CABC ≤ C[AC] + b/N
C[AB] + C[AC] = CBAC ≤ C[BC] + b/N
(1)
Note that the last two equations lead to:{
C[AB] ≤ −C[BC] + C[AC] + b/N
C[AB] ≤ −C[AC] + C[BC] + b/N
One can check that (n∗ABC , n∗BAC) = (0, 0) is a solution.
If the equilibrium is not the trivial null solution, then either
n∗ABC 6= 0 or n
∗
BAC 6= 0. Either way leads to C[AB] > 0
and thus −b/N < C[AC] − C[BC] < b/N which implies that
C[AC] = C[BC]. Equation 1 becomes:{
0 ≤ a(n∗ABC + 1 + n
∗
BAC) + b
a(n∗ABC + n
∗
BAC) ≤ b
⇔ a(n∗ABC + n
∗
BAC) ≤ b
But then:
C[AC] = C[BC] ⇔ b(n
∗
AC + n
∗
BAC) = b(n
∗
BC + n
∗
ABC) ⇔
N − n∗ABC + n
∗
BAC = N − n
∗
BAC + n
∗
ABC ⇔ n
∗
ABC =
n∗BAC . Therefore the equilibrium is symmetrical. Jointly with
a(n∗ABC + n
∗
BAC) ≤ b, this leads to the conclusion.
Corollary 2. For N ≥ N0 = ⌈ b2a⌉, there exists exactly b/2a+
1 Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
B. The potential and asymptotic uniqueness
When the number of players N grows to infinity, the
limiting game becomes a non-atomic game with a potential [7]
F∞(fABC , fBAC) = b(fABC−fBAC)
2+
a
2
(fABC + fBAC)
2
.
Indeed, recall that the potential g is unique up to an additive
constant and that it satisfies
∂g
∂fAC
def
= CAC = b(fAC + fBAC)
∂g
∂fABC
def
= CABC = a(fABC + fBAC) + b(fABC + fBC)
∂g
∂fBC
def
= CBC = b(fBC + fABC)
∂g
∂fBAC
def
= CBAC = a(fABC + fBAC) + b(fBAC + fAC).
One can check that the function
g(fAC , fABC , fBC , fBAC) =
a
2 (fABC + fBAC)
2
+ b2 ((fAC + fBAC)
2 + (fBC + fABC)
2)
readily satisfies these conditions. Then g can be rewritten as
g(fABC , fBAC) =
a
2 (fABC + fBAC)
2 + b2 (1 + (fABC − fBAC)
2).
As the potential is unique up to an additive constant, we
consider F∞ = g − b.Id/2.
Proposition 3. The non-atomic game has a unique Nash
equilibrium, which is f∗ABC = f∗BAC = 0.
Proof: Note that:
∂F∞
∂fABC
= a(fABC + fBAC) + 2b(fABC − fBAC))
∂F∞
∂fBAC
= a(fABC + fBAC) + 2b(fBAC − fABC))
Hence, the potential is twice differentiable with Hessian
matrix (
a+ 2b a− 2b
a− 2b a+ 2b
)
.
This Hessian is definite positive and hence the potential is
(strictly) convex. Therefore it has a unique minimum, which
is the only Nash equilibrium of the game. Finally, note that
∀fABC ∈ (0, 1), fBAC ∈ (0, 1), F∞(fABC , fBAC) ≥ 0 and
that F∞(0, 0) = 0, which concludes the proof.
To show the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the limiting
game, we made use of the fact that the limiting game has a
potential which is convex. Yet, not only the limiting game has
a convex potential, but also the original one, as we conclude
from next theorem, whose proof is a direct application of [5].
Theorem 4. For any finite number of players, the game is a
potential game [8] with the potential function:
F (fABC , fBAC) =
bN(fABC − fBAC)
2
+
aN
2
(fABC + fBAC) (fABC + fBAC + 1/N) .
(2)
Proof: Consider a connection following route ABC. Its
cost is a(fABC + fBAC) + b(fABC + 1 − fBAC). If this
connection switches its strategy to route AC, then its cost
becomes b(1−fABC+fBAC+1/N). Therefore the associated
change of cost is
∆= a(fABC + fBAC) + b(fABC + 1− fBAC)
−b(1− fABC + fBAC + 1/N)
= a(fABC + fBAC) + b(2fABC − 2fBAC − 1/N).
Now:
1
N (F (fABC , fBAC)− F (fABC − 1/N, fBAC))
= b
[
(fABC − fBAC)
2 − (fABC − 1/N − fBAC)
2
]
+a2 [(fABC + fBAC) (fABC + fBAC + 1/N)
− (fABC + fBAC − 1/N) (fABC + fBAC)]
=
b
N
(2fABC − 2fBAC − 1/N) +
a
N
(fABC + fBAC)
= ∆/N.
By symmetry, the same argument holds for a connection
originating from source B.
Note that unlike the framework of non-atomic games, the
fact that the game has a convex potential does not imply
uniqueness. The reason for that is that in congestion games,
the action space over which the potential is minimized is
not a convex set (due to the non-splitable nature) so that
it may have several local minima, each corresponding to
another equilibrium, whereas a for a convex function over the
Euclidean space, there is a unique local minimum which is also
a global minimum of the function (and thus an equilibrium of
the game).
C. Efficiency
Theorem 5. In the non-atomic setting, the only Nash equilib-
rium is also the social optimum (i.e. the point minimizing the
sum of costs of all players) of the system.
Proof: The sum of costs of all players is
fABCCABC + fACCAC + fBACCBAC + fBCCBC
= a(fABC + fBAC)
2
+b((fBC + fABC)
2 + (fAC + fBAC)
2)
= a(fABC + fBAC)
2 + 2b(1 + (fABC − fBAC)
2).
(3)
The minimum is hence obtained for (fABC , fBAC) =
(0, 0).
Since the game possesses several equilibria, we can expect
the PoA (Price of Anarchy - the largest ratio between the
sum of costs at an equilibrium and the sum of costs at the
social optimum) and PoS (Price of Stability - the smallest
corresponding ratio) to be different.
Theorem 6. The price of stability of the game is 1 and the
price of anarchy is 1 + b2aN2 .
Proof: From Eq. 3 the price of anarchy (resp. stability)
is by definition the maximum (resp. minimum) value over the
Nash equilibria of:
a(f∗ABC + f
∗
BAC)
2 + 2b(1 + (f∗ABC − f
∗
BAC)
2)
2b
Then, from Theorem 1:
PoA = max
p≤b/2a
(2p/N)2 + 2b
2b
= max
p≤b/2a
2ap2/N2 + b
b
=
2a(b/2aN)2 + b
b
=
2ab2
4ba2N2
+ 1 =
b
2aN2
+ 1
and
PoS = min
p≤b/2a
a(2p/N)2 + 2b
2b
= min
p≤b/2a
2ap2/N2
b
+ 1 = 1.
We make the following observations:
(i) In the splitable atomic games studied in [6] the PoA was
shown to be greater than one for sufficiently small number of
players (smaller than some threshold), and was 1 for all large
enough number of players (larger than the same threshold).
Here for any number of players, the PoS is 1 and the PoA is
greater than 1.
(ii) The PoA decreases in N and tends to 1 as N tends to
infinity, the case of splitable games.
(iii) We have shown that the PoA is unbounded: for any
real value K and any number of players one can choose the
cost parameters a and b so that the PoA exceeds K . This
corresponds to what was observed in splitable games [6] and
contrast with the non-atomic setting of single commodity flows
(i.e. when there is only one source node instead of two), and
arbitrary topology networks where the PoA equals 4/3 [9].
IV. ATOMIC SEMI-SPLITABLE CASE AND ITS SPLITABLE
LIMIT (F4 FRAMEWORK)
The game can be expressed as a 2-player matrix game where
each player (i.e. each source node A and B) has N+1 possible
actions, for each of the N + 1 possible values of fABC and
fBAC respectively.
The utility for player A is
UA(fABC , fBAC) = fACCAC + fABCCABC
= b− bfABC + bfBAC
+(a− 2b)fABCfBAC + (a+ 2b)f
2
ABC
(4)
Similarly, for player B:
UB(fABC , fBAC) = fBCCBC + fBACCBAC
= b− bfBAC + bfABC
+(a− 2b)fBACfABC + (a+ 2b)f
2
BAC
(5)
Note that
∂UA
∂fABC
= −b+ (a− 2b)fBAC + 2(a+ 2b)fABC
and ∂UB
∂fBAC
= −b+ (a− 2b)fABC + 2(a+ 2b)fBAC .
Hence
∂2UA
∂f2ABC
= 2(a + 2b) =
∂2UB
∂f2BAC
. Therefore, both
uA : fABC 7→ UA(fABC , fBAC) and uB : fBAC 7→
UB(fABC , fBAC) are (strictly) convex functions. This means
that for each action of one player, there would be a unique
best response to the second player if its action space was the
interval (0, 1). Hence, for the limit case (when N →∞), the
best response is unique. In contrast, for any finite value of N ,
there are either 1 or 2 possible best responses which are the
discrete optima of functions uA : fABC 7→ UA(fABC , fBAC)
and uB : fBAC 7→ UB(fABC , fBAC). We will however show
that in the finite case, there may be up to 2 × 2 = 4 Nash
equilibria while in the limit case the equilibrium is always
unique.
A. Efficiency
Note that the total cost of the players is
Σ(fABC , fBAC) = UA(fABC , fBAC) + UB(fABC , fBAC)
= 2b+ 2(a− 2b)fABCfBAC + (a+ 2b)(f
2
ABC + f
2
BAC)
= 2b+ a(fABC + fBAC)
2 + 2b(fABC − fBAC)
2
≥ 2b.
Further, note that Σ = 2(F∞ + b). Hence Σ is strictly
convex. Also Σ(0, 0) = 2b. Therefore (0, 0) is the (unique)
social optimum of the system. Yet, for sufficiently large N
(that is, as soon as we add enough flexibility in the players’
strategies), this is not a Nash equilibrium, as stated in the
following theorem:
Theorem 7. The point (fABC , fBAC) = (0, 0) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if N ≤ ab + 2.
Proof: By symmetry and as uA : fABC 7→
UA(fABC , fBAC) is convex, then (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium
iff UA(0, 0) ≤ UA(1/N, 0) = b − b/N + (a+ 2b)/N2 which
leads to the conclusion.
Also, we can bound the total cost by:
Σ(fABC , fBAC) =
= 2b+ 2(a− 2b)fABCfBAC + (a+ 2b)(f
2
ABC + f
2
BAC)
≤ 2b+ (a− 2b)(f2ABC + f
2
BAC) + (a+ 2b)(f
2
ABC + f
2
BAC)
≤ 2b+ 2a(f2ABC + f
2
BAC)
≤ 2b+ 4a
This bound is attained at Σ(1, 1) = 2b+2(a− 2b)+ 2(a+
2b) = 4a+2b. Yet, it is not obtained at the Nash equilibrium
for sufficiently large values of N :
Theorem 8. (1, 1) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if N ≤
2b+ a
3a+ b
.
Proof: We have UA(1, 1) = b+ 2a and
UA(1− 1/N, 1) = 2a+ b− 3a/N − b/N + 2b/N
2 + a/N2.
Therefore UA(1−1/N, 1) ≥ UA(1, 1)⇔ 2b+a ≥ (3a+b)N .
The conclusion follows by convexity.
Therefore, for N ≥ max(ab + 2,
2b+a
3a+b ) the Nash equilibria
are neither optimal nor worse-case strategies of the game.
B. Case of N = 1
In case of N = 1 (one flow arrives at each source node and
there are thus two players) the two approach coincides: the
atomic non-splitable case (F3) is also a semi-splitable atomic
game (F4). fABC and fBAC take values in {{0}, {1}}. From
Eq. 4 and Eq. 5, the matrix game can be written(
(b , b) (2b , a+ 2b)
(a+ 2b ,2b) (2a+ b , 2a+ b)
)
and the potential of Eq. 2 becomes(
0 a+ b
a+ b 3a
)
.
Then, assuming that either a or b is non null, we get that
(0, 0) is always a Nash equilibrium and that (1, 1) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if 3a ≤ a+ b, i.e. 2a < b.
We next consider any integer N and identify another surpris-
ing feature of the equilibrium. We show that depending on the
sign of a−2b, non-symmetric equilibria arise in our symmetric
game. In all frameworks other than the semi-splitable games
there are only symmetric equilibria in this game. We shall
show however that in the limit (as N grows to infinity), the
limiting game has a single equilibrium.
C. Case a− 2b < 0
In this case, there may be multiple equilibria, as shown in
the following example.
Example 9. Consider a = 1, b = 3 and N = 4, then the cost
matrices are given below, with the two Nash equilibria of the
game represented in bold letters:
UA =
1
16

48 60 72 84 96
43 50 57 64 71
52 54 56 58 60
75 72 69 66 63
112 104 96 88 80
, and
UB =
1
16

48 43 52 75 112
60 50 54 72 104
72 57 56 69 96
84 64 58 66 88
96 71 60 63 80
.
Note that due to the shape of UA and UB the cost matrices
of the game are transpose of each other. Therefore in the
following, we shall only give matrix UA.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 10. All Nash equilibria are symmetrical, i.e.
f∗ABC = f
∗
BAC .
The proof is given in Appendix A.
D. Case a = 2b (with a > 0)
When a = 2b, we shall show that some non-symmetrical
equilibria exists.
Theorem 11. If a = 2b, there are exactly either 1 or 4 Nash
equilibria. For any N , let N = ⌊N8 ⌋.
• If N mod 8 = 4, there are 4 equilibria (n∗ABC , n∗BAC),
which are (N,N), (N + 1, N), (N,N + 1) and (N +
1, N + 1).
• Otherwise, there is a unique equilibrium, which is (N,N)
if N mod 8 < 4 or (N + 1, N + 1) if N mod 8 > 4.
Proof: The Nash equilibria are the optimal points for both
uA and uB . They are therefore either interior or boundary
points (i.e. either fABC or fBAC are in 0, 1). We detail the
interior point cases in Appendix B. The rest of the proof
derives directly from the definition of ∂UA
∂fABC
and ∂UB
∂fBAC
.
Indeed:
∂UA
∂fABC
= (a− 2b)fBAC +2(2b+a)fABC− b = 8bfABC − b
∂UB
∂fBAC
= (a−2b)fABC+2(a+2b)fBAC−b = 8bfBAC−b.
Both are minimum for 1/8. Therefore, it is attained if N is a
multiple of 8. Otherwise, the best response of each player is
either 1N ⌊
N
8 ⌋ if N mod 8 ≤ 3 or
1
N ⌈
N
8 ⌉ if N mod 8 ≥ 5. If
N mod 8 = 4, then each player has 2 best responses which
are 1N
N−4
8 and
1
N
N+4
8 . Then, one can check that the boundary
points follow the law of Theorem 15 when N = ⌊N8 ⌋ = 0.
E. Case a− 2b > 0
Theorem 12. If a− 2b > 0, there are exactly either 1, 2 or 3
Nash equilibria.
Let α =
a+ 2b
3a+ 2b
, β =
2a
3a+ 2b
and γ = b
3a+ 2b
.
Define further N˜ = ⌊Nγ⌋ and z(N) = Nγ − N˜ . The
equilibria are of the form
• Either (N˜ , N˜), (N˜ + 1, N˜), (N˜ , N˜ + 1)
if N is such that z(N) = α (mode 3-A in Figure 2)
• Or (N˜ +1, N˜ +1), (N˜ +1, N˜), (N˜ , N˜ +1) if N is such
that z(N) = β (mode 3-B)
• Or (N˜ , N˜ + 1), (N˜ + 1, N˜)
if N is such that α < z(N) < β (mode 2)
• Or (N˜ , N˜)
if N is such that β < z(N) < α+ 1 (mode 1).
Mode 3-A Mode 3-B Mode 3-A Mode 3-B
α β α+ 1 β + 1
Mode 2 Mode 2Mode 1
Fig. 2. Different modes according to different values of N .
We illustrate the different modes in the following example.
Example 13. Suppose that a = 10 and b = 3 (we represent
only the part of the matrices corresponding to 1/N ≤
fABC , fBAC ≤ 4/N ).
If N = 24, there are 3 Nash equilibria:
1152 1200 1248 1296
1118 1172 1226 1280
1112 1172 1232 1292
1134 1200 1266 1332
If N = 26, there are 2 Nash equilibria:
1352 1404 1456 1508
1314 1372 1430 1488
1304 1368 1432 1496
1322 1392 1462 1532
If N = 27, there are 3 Nash equilibria:
1458 1512 1566 1620
1418 1478 1538 1598
1406 1472 1538 1604
1422 1494 1566 1638
If N = 28, there is a single Nash equilibrium:
1568 1624 1680 1736
1526 1588 1650 1712
1512 1580 1648 1716
1526 1600 1674 1748
F. Limit Case: Perfectly Splitable Sessions
We focus here in the limit case where N → +∞.
Theorem 14. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium and it
is such that
f∗BAC = f
∗
ABC =
b
3a+ 2b
.
Proof: Note that ∂UA
∂fABC
(1) > 0 and ∂UB
∂fBAC
(1) > 0.
If fABC = 0 then fBAC = b2a+4b which implies that −b +
b(a−2b)
2a+4b ≥ 0, which further implies that −a − 6b > 0 which
is impossible. Hence fABC > 0. Similarly fBAC > 0 which
concludes the proof.
Recall that the optimum sum (social optimum) is given
by (0, 0) and that the worse case is given by (1, 1). Hence,
regardless of the values of a and b, at the limit case, we observe
that there is a unique Nash equilibrium, that is symmetrical,
and is neither optimal (as opposed to F3), nor the worst case
scenario. The price of anarchy is then:
PoA = PoS =
2b+ 2f∗
2
ABCa
2b
= 1 +
ab
(3a+ 2b)2
.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We revisited in this paper a load balancing problem within
a non-cooperative routing game framework. This model had
already received much attention in the past within some
classical frameworks (the Wardrop equilibrium analysis and
the atomic splitable routing game framework). We studied this
game under other frameworks - the non splitable atomic game
(known as congestion game) as well as a the semi-splitable
framework. We have identified many surprising features of
equilibria in both frameworks. We showed that unlike the
previously studied frameworks, there is no uniqueness of equi-
librium, and non-symmetric equilibria may appear (depending
on the parameters). For each of the frameworks we identified
the different equilibria and provided some of their properties.
We also provided an efficiency analysis in terms of price
of anarchy and price of stability. In the future we plan to
investigate more general cost structures and topologies.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 10.
Suppose that (f∗ABC , f∗BAC) is a Nash equilibrium with
f∗ABC 6= f
∗
BAC . Then, by definition:
UA(f
∗
ABC , f
∗
BAC) ≤ UA(f
∗
BAC , f
∗
BAC) and
UB(f
∗
ABC , f
∗
BAC) ≤ UB(f
∗
ABC , f
∗
ABC),
which gives, after some manipulations,
(a− 2b)f∗ABCf
∗
BAC ≤
2af∗2BAC + bf
∗
ABC − bfBAC − (a+ 2b)f
∗2
ABC
(a− 2b)f∗ABCf
∗
BAC ≤
2af∗2ABC + bf
∗
BAC − bf
∗
ABC − (a+ 2b)f
∗2
BAC .
Therefore 2(a− 2b)f∗ABCf∗BAC ≤ (a− 2b)(f∗2ABC + f∗2BAC)
and hence 0 ≤ (a−2b)(f∗ABC −f∗BAC)2 which is impossible.
B. Boundary equilibria when a = 2b.
Theorem 15. If a = 2b, there exists a single Nash equilibrium
of the form (0, f∗BAC) and (f∗BAC , 0) with f∗BAC non null. It
is obtained for N = 4 and f∗BAC = 1/4. The points (0, 0) are
Nash equilibria if and only if N ≤ 4. Further, there are no
equilibrium of the form (fABC , 1) or (1, fBAC).
Proof: We first study the equilibria of the form (0, fABC).
(0, γ) is a Nash equilibrium iff
UA(0, γ) ≤ UA
(
1
N
, γ
)
UB(0, γ) ≤ UB
(
0, γ +
1
N
)
UB(0, γ) ≤ UB
(
0, γ −
1
N
) ⇔

b ≤
2b+ a
N
b ≤ (a+ 2b)(2γ +
1
N
)
b ≥ (a+ 2b)(2γ −
1
N
)
⇔

1 ≤
4
N
1 ≤ 4(2γ +
1
N
)
1 ≥ 4(2γ − 1/N)
⇔
{
N ≤ 4
N/8− 1/2
N
≤ γ
≤
N/8 + 1/2
N
If N ≤ 3 then N/8 + 1/2 ≤ 7/8 < 1 which cannot be
obtained by the player otherwise than in 0. For N = 4, the
second inequality becomes 0 ≤ γ ≤ 14 which hence leads to
the only non null Nash equilibrium.
We next study the potential equilibria of the form
(fABC , 1). Let (γ, 1) be a Nash equilibrium. Then
UB(γ, 1) ≤ UB(γ, 1− 1/N). Then
bγ + a+ 2b ≤ b− b(1− 1/N) + bγ + (a+ 2b)(1− 1/N)2
⇒ a+ 2b ≤ b/N + (a+ 2b)(1 + 1/N2 − 2/N)
⇒ 0 ≤ b+ (a+ 2b)(1/N − 2)
⇒ 2a+ 3b ≤ (a+ 2b)/N ⇒ N ≤ 1/4.
C. Boundary equilibria when a− 2b > 0.
Theorem 16. (0, α) and (α, 0) are Nash equilibria iff:
b
a− 2b
−
1
N
a+ 2b
a− 2b
≤ α ≤
b
2(a+ 2b)
+
1
2N
.
Further, there are no Nash equilibrium of the form (A, 1).
Proof: We first focus on the Nash equilibria of the form
(0, A). Since UA(., fBAC) and UB(fABC , .) are convex, (0, γ)
is a Nash equilibrium iff
UA(0, γ) ≤ UA
(
1
N
, γ
)
UB(0, γ) ≤ UB
(
0, γ +
1
N
)
UB(0, γ) ≤ UB
(
0, γ −
1
N
)
⇔

b ≤ (a− 2b)γ +
2b+ a
N
b ≤ (a+ 2b)(2γ +
1
N
)
b ≥ (a+ 2b)(2γ − 1N )
⇔

γ ≥
bN − 2b− a
N(a− 2b)
γ ≥
bN − a− 2b
2N(a+ 2b)
γ ≤
bN + a+ 2b
2N(a+ 2b)
But bN−2b−aN(a−2b) ≥
bN−a−2b
2N(a+2b) which concludes the proof. and
hence bN−a−2b2N(a+2b) ≤ γ ≤
bN+a+2b
2N(a+2b)
We now study the potential equilibria of the form (A, 1). Let
(A, 1) be a Nash equilibrium. Then UB(A, 1) ≤ UB(A, 1 −
1/N). Then
−b+ (a− 2b)A+ (a+ 2b) ≤ −b(1− 1/N)
+(a− 2b)A(1− 1/N) + (a+ 2b)(1− 1/N)2
⇒ 0 ≤ b− (a− 2b)A+ (a+ 2b)(−2 + 1/N)
⇒ (a− 2b)A ≤ −2a− 3b+ (a+ 2b)/N ⇒
⇒ 2a+ 3b ≤ (a− 2b)A+ 2a+ 3b ≤ (a+ 2b)/N
But 2a+ 3b ≤ (a+ 2b)/N ⇒ N ≤ a+2b2a+3b < 1.
D. Proof of Theorem 12.
We first start by showing that there are at most 4 interior
Nash equilibria and that they are of the form: (A,A),(A +
1, A),(A,A+ 1),(A+ 1, A+ 1).
Proof: Let fABC , fBAC be a Nash equilibrium in the
interior (i.e. 0 < fABC < 1 and 0 < fBAC < 1). Then fABC
and fBAC are the (discrete) minimizers of x 7→ UA(x, fBAC)
and x 7→ UB(fABC , x) respectively. Further:
∂UA
∂fABC
= −b+ (a− 2b)fBAC + 2(2b+ a)fABC
∂UB
∂fBAC
= −b+ (a− 2b)fABC + 2(a+ 2b)fBAC
The optimum values are therefore respectively:
xA =
b− θfBAC
λ
and xB =
b− θfABC
λ
with λ = 2(2b+ a) and θ = a− 2b. Therefore: xA −
1
2N ≤ fABC ≤ xA +
1
2N
xB −
1
2N ≤ fBAC ≤ xB +
1
2N .
Hence
b
λ
−
θ
λ
(
b
λ
−
θ
λ
fABC +
1
2N
)
−
1
2N
≤ fABC ≤
1
2N
+
b
λ
−
θ
λ
(
b
λ
−
θ
λ
fABC −
1
2N
)
Then
b
λ+ θ
−
λ
2N (λ− θ)
≤ fABC ≤
λ
2N (λ− θ)
+
b
λ+ θ
Then b
λ+ θ
=
b
2b+ 3a
,
λ
2N (λ− θ)
=
4b+ 2a
2N (6b+ a)
and
λ
2N (λ− θ)
=
2(a+ 2b)
2N (6b+ a)
, which gives
b
2b+ 3a
−
a+ 2b
N (6b+ a)
≤ fABC ≤
2b+ a
N (6b+ a)
+
b
2b+ 3a
.
Similarly, we have
b
2b+ 3a
−
(2b+ a)
N(6b+ a)
≤ fBAC ≤
b
2b+ 3a
+
2b+ a
N(6b+ a)
.
Note that 12 <
2b+a
6b+a < 1. Therefore there are either 1 or
2 possible values, which are identical for fABC and fBAC .
There are therefore 4 possible equilibria.
Now, the potential equilibria are of the form (A,A), (A,A+
1), (A + 1, A) and (A + 1, A + 1). By symmetry, note that
if (A,A + 1) is a Nash equilibrium, then (A + 1, A) also is.
The following lemma reduces the number of combinations of
equilibria:
Lemma 17. If (A,A) is a Nash equilibrium then (A+1, A+1)
is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that (A,A) and (A + 1, A+ 1) are two
Nash equilibria. Then UA(A,A) ≤ UA(A+1, A) and UA(A+
1, A+ 1) ≤ UA(A,A + 1), which implies
−bAN + (a− 2b)A2 + (2b+ a)A2 ≤
−b(A+ 1)N + (a− 2b)A(A+ 1) + (2b+ a)(A+ 1)2
−b(A+ 1)N + (a− 2b)(A+ 1)2 + (2b+ a)(A+ 1)2 ≤
−bAN + (a− 2b)A(A+ 1) + (2b+ a)A2
⇒
{
bN ≤ (a− 2b)A+ (2b+ a)(2A+ 1)
(a− 2b)(A+ 1) + (2b+ a)(2A+ 1) ≤ bN
⇒ (a− 2b)(A+ 1) ≤ bN − (2b+ a)(2A+ 1) ≤ (a− 2b)A
Hence (a−2b)(A+1) ≤ (a−2b)A and therefore a−2b ≤ 0
which is impossible.
Therefore the different possible combinations are mode 1,
mode 2, mode 3-A and mode 3-B in Figure 2).
We first start by the occurrence of mode 3-A:
Lemma 18. Suppose that a − 2b > 0. Suppose that (A,A)
and (A+ 1, A) are two Nash equilibria. Then
A =
bN − 2b− a
3a+ 2b
.
Proof: Suppose that (A,A) and (A+1, A) are two Nash
equilibria. Then necessarily UA(A,A) = UA(A+1, A). Hence
−bAN + (a− 2b)A2 + (2b+ a)A2
= −b(A+ 1)N + (a− 2b)A(A+ 1) + (2b+ a)(A + 1)2
i.e.
bN = (a−2b)A+(2b+a)(2A+1)⇒ bN−2b−a = (3a+2b)A
which leads to the conclusion.
Hence, the system is in mode 3-A iff bN−2b−a is divisible
by 3a+2b or in other words, if N is of the form (3a+2b)K+2ab
for some integer K .
We then move on to Mode 3-B:
Lemma 19. Suppose that a − 2b > 0. Suppose that (A +
1, A+ 1) and (A+ 1, A) are two Nash equilibria. Then
A =
bN − 2a
3a+ 2b
.
Proof: Suppose that (A + 1, A + 1) and (A,A + 1) are
two Nash equilibria, then U1(A+ 1, A+ 1) = U1(A,A+ 1).
This implies
−Nb(A+ 1) + (a− 2b)(A+ 1)2 + (2b+ a)(A+ 1)2 =
−NbA+ (a− 2b)A(A+ 1) + (2b+ a)A2
⇒ (a− 2b)(A+ 1) + (2b+ a)(2A+ 1) = Nb
⇒ (3a+ 2b)A = Nb− 2a
which concludes the proof.
Hence, the system is in mode 3-B iff bN − 2a is divis-
ible by 3a + 2b or in other words, if N is of the form
(3a+ 2b)K + 2b+ a
b
for some integer K .
Finally, for Mode 2:
Lemma 20. Suppose that a−2b > 0. Suppose that (A,A+1)
and (A+ 1, A) are only two Nash equilibria. Then
(3a+ 2b)A+ 2b+ a < bN < (3a+ 2b)A+ 2a.
Proof: Suppose that (A,A + 1) and (A + 1, A) are two
Nash equilibria, then:
UA(A,A+ 1) ≤ UA(A+ 1, A+ 1) and
UA(A+ 1, A) ≤ UA(A,A)
ie {
bN ≤ (3a+ 2b)A+ 2a
(3a+ 2b)A+ 2b+ a ≤ bN
The conclusion comes from Lemma 18 and 19, since neither
(A,A) nor (A+ 1, A+ 1) are Nash equilibria.
Finally the system is in mode 1 if it is not in any over
modes. One can then check that the boundary cases found
in Theorem 16 corresponds to the case where A = 0 which
concludes the proof.
